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Abstract 
This paper is a historical, legal and philosophical analysis of the concept of human dignity in 
German and Kenyan constitutional law. We base our analysis on decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, in particular its take on life imprisonment and its 2006 decision 
concerning the shooting of hijacked airplanes, and on a close reading of the Constitution of 
Kenya. We also present a dialogue between us in which we offer some critical remarks on the 
concept of human dignity in the two constitutions, each one of us from his own philosophical 
perspective. 
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Introduction: Human Dignity as a Legal Concept 
Dignity as a legal concept enjoys increasing popularity all over the world. It can be found in the 
Basic Laws of Israel (Israel 1992, Articles 1, 4), the Constitution of South Africa (Republic of 
South Africa 1996, Articles 1, 7, 10), as well as in the proposed draft of the new Moroccan 
constitution put forward by King Mohammed VI in response to recent pro-democracy protests 
(Kingdom of Morocco 2011). Human dignity has also been invoked by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in some of its recent opinions (see, e.g., Law vs. Canada), and a Swiss government ethics 
committee even went so far as to issue guidelines on the dignity of plants (Federal Ethics 
Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology 2008). 
 
In the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz),1 hereafter referred to as 
“the Basic Law”, the concept of dignity is most prominently located in Article 1 Section 1: 
Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist 
Verpflichtung aller staatlicher Gewalt. [Human dignity shall be inviolable. To 
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority] (Basic Law, Article 1 
Section 1). 
The Constitution of Kenya mentions the word “dignity” thirteen times, most prominently in 
Article 10 among the “National values and principles of governance”, and in Article 28, titled 
“Human Dignity”. Thus both the German and Kenyan constitutions are crafted in line with a 
global trend which considers human dignity to be the fundamental value, or one of the 
fundamental values, of a society that adequately respects human rights. 
 
The concept of human dignity is rooted in religious tradition, the ideas of the eighteenth century 
European Enlightenment, and contemporary secular theories of autonomy and self-determination. 
In particular, it is commonly associated with the Judeo-Christian doctrine that humans are created 
in god’s image (imago dei) and the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant which views the human 
person as having intrinsic worth by virtue of his or her rational faculty. Although the concept of 
dignity has a long history, it did not find its way into any legal framework prior to the 20th 
century.2 
 
Besides its role as a constitutional value in several jurisdictions, human dignity enjoys popularity 
in a wide variety of social contexts. It was invoked by Martin Luther King, Jr. in support of the 
                                                 
1
 The Basic Law is the constitutional law of Germany. Since it was regarded as provisional when drafted, the German 
term “Verfassung” (constitution) was not used. 
2
 Human dignity as a legal concept was first quoted, even though in a rather insignificant role, in Article 151 Section 
5 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919: “The economy has to be organized based on the principles of justice, with the 
goal of achieving life in dignity for everyone.” 
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African-American Civil Rights Movement.3 Similarly, working conditions in Bangladeshi 
sweatshops are criticized for being undignified, and the World Medical Association also identifies 
human dignity in its Declaration of Helsinki as one of the goods physicians ought to protect.4 The 
concept of human dignity is usually associated with the notion that every individual human being 
has intrinsic worth by virtue of being human, and that this worth entitles him or her to respect 
from all other human beings. Yet there is no universally accepted definition of the term. Some 
have taken this fact to show that no sense can be made of human dignity. However, we suspect 
that too many senses can be made of the term. We will not attempt to provide a survey of these 
many (more or less useful) senses. Instead, we will restrict ourselves to the senses that are given 
to the concept of human dignity in German and Kenyan constitutional law. 
 
This paper undertakes a critical examination of the concept of human dignity in German and 
Kenyan constitutional law. Our analysis starts with Germany, and the meaning of human dignity 
that can be extracted from the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht),5 which is the ultimate authority regarding the interpretation of the 
Basic Law. Josef Isensee called human dignity as posited in the German Basic Law an “article of 
faith of a civil religion” (Isensee 2006, 179). We shall try to approach and circumscribe this 
article of faith through a detailed analysis of the Court’s take on life imprisonment and its 2006 
decision concerning the shooting of hijacked airplanes. We shall then move on to the case of 
Kenya. After presenting a brief history of constitutional law in Kenya, we shall trace the concept 
of dignity throughout the country’s current constitution. Finally, we shall present a dialogue 
between us, in which we shall offer some critical remarks on the concept of human dignity in the 
constitutions of Germany and Kenya, each one of us from his own philosophical perspective. 
 
Human Dignity in German Constitutional Law 
 
Article 1 of the German Basic Law 
Historically, the strong commitment to human dignity expressed in Article 1 Section 1 of the 
German Basic Law is to be understood as a reaction to the atrocities of National Socialism. The 
German Basic Law was drafted with the intention to prevent the horror of totalitarianism from 
                                                 
3
 For example, in his “Letter from Birmingham Jail”, King writes: “Now is the time to lift our national policy from 
the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity” (Martin Luther King, Jr. 2008, 113). 
4
 “It is the duty of physicians who participate in medical research to protect the life, health, dignity, integrity, right to 
self-determination, privacy, and confidentiality of personal information of research subjects” (WMA General 
Assembly 2008, Article 11). 
5
 In the following, we will refer to this court simply as “the Court”. 
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ever happening again. This intention of Article 1 is explicitly stated in the preamble of a number 
of German state constitutions.6 The Constitution of Bremen, for example, says in its preamble that 
it is given “[e]rschüttert von der Vernichtung, die die autoritäre Regierung der Nationalsozialisten 
unter Mißachtung der persönlichen Freiheit und der Würde des Menschen […] verursacht hat” 
(Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2009, Preamble) - shaken by the destruction, which the authoritarian 
government of the National Socialists caused through its disregard for the personal freedom and 
dignity of man. Human dignity was introduced as the fundamental value of a new Germany when 
the Basic Law came into effect on May 23, 1949, and it serves as an absolute barrier to what 
individuals as well as the state in all its manifestations may legitimately do. 
 
Article 1 of the Basic Law, as quoted in the introduction to this paper, establishes human dignity 
as the central value of the German Basic Law (BVerfGE 27, 1; BVerfGE 65, 1)7 and the “highest 
constitutional value” in Germany (BVerfGE 5, 85; BVerfGE 6, 32; BVerfGE 45, 187; BVerfGE 
109, 279; BVerfGE 115, 118).8 Rather than constituting an independent civil right in itself, the 
dignity clause is commonly interpreted as representing the basis for all the rights protected in the 
Basic Law (BVerfGE 6, 32; BVerfGE 115, 118). Accordingly, the literature on German 
constitutional law sometimes refers to human dignity as the “original right to have rights” 
(Enders 2010, 3). 
 
The designation of human dignity as the central value of the German legal order reflects the 
intention to elevate Germany beyond the inhumanity of Hitler Germany, with a view to ensuring 
that totalitarianism does not find ground in Germany ever again. The protection of human dignity 
is therefore guaranteed in perpetuity by the Basic Law. The so-called eternity clause, Article 79 
Section 3 of the Basic Law, prevents the legislature from making any amendments to the Basic 
Law that affect Article 1.9 
 
                                                 
6
 In fact, human dignity is not referred to in the constitutions of only three out of sixteen German states: Hamburg, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen. 
7
 “BVerfGE” stands for “Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidung”, which is German for “decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany”. The first number that follows this abbreviation refers to the volume of (Verein der 
Richter des Bundesverfassungsgerichts), where decisions of the Court can be found, the second number to the first 
page of the decision. 
8
 Note that, while the American constitution, for example, emphasizes the limitation of state power and the protection 
of negative liberties, the Basic Law also contains a significant positive element that obliges the German government 
to take affirmative steps to enforce our rights and further respect for human dignity. E.g., Article 1 provides the 
foundation for the social welfare principle as formulated in Article 20 Section 1. The state has a legal obligation to 
provide a minimal existence to all its citizens. 
9
 “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting […] the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.” 
(Basic Law, Article 79 Section 3.) The eternity clause does not explicitly protect itself from revision by the 
legislature. Therefore, taken at face value, the eternity clause could rather easily be circumvented. Because of this 
fact, the clause is commonly taken to demand a purposive interpretation under which it is implicitly self-entrenched. 
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The dignity clause precedes the list of basic rights guaranteed by the Basic Law. While these 
rights, including the right to life, may be restricted, human dignity is absolute; it is said to be 
“inviolable”. Dignity is, hence, not only shielded from constitutional amendment, but also from 
legislative incursion. If a law is found to breach human dignity, a court has sufficient reason to 
declare it unconstitutional. Neither a parliamentary nor a popular majority can possibly justify 
laws or actions that infringe upon human dignity. Not even the person in question can justify such 
an infringement by voluntarily consenting to it, as noted by German courts in cases concerning 
dwarf throwing (NVwZ 1993, 98) and peep shows (BVerwGE 64, 274). 
 
The declaration of the inviolability of human dignity in Section 1 of Article 1 is followed by two 
more sections (Basic Law, Article 1): 
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable 
 human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice 
 in the world. 
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and 
 the judiciary as directly applicable law. 
Section 2 emphasizes the (alleged) utmost importance of human dignity and human rights for 
peace and justice, and presents human dignity as the reason10 for proclaiming human rights. 
 
Given the notorious vagueness of the term, the authors of the Basic Law felt the necessity to 
qualify the legal meaning of human dignity. Accordingly, Section 3 establishes the basic rights 
listed in Articles 2 to 19 as manifestations of human dignity. Under normal circumstances, human 
dignity is sufficiently protected by respecting these basic rights. Since Article 1 was most 
commonly applied by the Court in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, the following brief 
elaboration on these two articles is instructive on the interplay between human dignity and basic 
rights. 
 
Article 2 guarantees a right to free development of personality (Basic Law, Article 2 Section 1), 
and is commonly taken to protect the freedom to act in accordance with one’s desires as long as 
one’s actions do not collide with the equal freedom of everybody else. In light of Article 1, this 
right is more generally regarded as a right to personality, linking the freedom of action to the 
intimate realm of human nature. This right includes, for example, the right to informational 
privacy (BVerfGE 65, 1), the right to one’s own picture, and the right to have one’s paternity 
established (BVerfGE 90, 263; BVerfGE 79, 256). Article 2 further guarantees the right to life 
                                                 
10
 Cf. the use of the word “therefore” in Section 2. 
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and physical integrity (Basic Law, Article 2 Section 2).11 Like the other basic rights, the right to 
life can be restricted by law. Killing a person, hence, may be in accordance with the Basic Law, 
such as in certain cases of self-defense. However, if a killing would involve a violation of human 
dignity, it cannot be legally justified. The right to physical integrity protects the bodies of 
individuals from invasions that would cause injury, harm or pain;12 in particular, it makes torture 
and capital punishment unacceptable. Since Article 1 Section 1 not only recognizes a negative 
state duty to “respect” but also a positive duty to “protect” human dignity, the German legislature 
must make efforts to prevent private violations of human dignity related to the physical integrity 
of persons (and other basic rights).13 Accordingly, § 1631 Section 2 of the German Civil Code 
(BGB), for example, prohibits the corporal punishment of children. 
 
Under the German constitution, dignity further means equality, as textually specified in Article 3. 
A society in which some are regarded as second-class citizens contradicts the ideal of human 
dignity. Therefore, slavery, racial and sex-based discrimination can have no place in the German 
social order. 
 
The basic rights flow from human dignity in the sense that they all have what we propose to call 
dignity-core. Human dignity is the “root of all basic rights” (BVerfGE 93, 266), informs the basic 
rights, and is the foremost rationale for protecting them. While the legislature may restrict basic 
rights, such a restriction is only constitutional as long as their dignity-core is not infringed.14 
There can be no balancing of human dignity with other basic laws (BVerfGE 93, 266; BVerfGE 
107, 275). Article 20 declares that in “no case […] the essence of a basic right [may] be affected” 
(Basic Law, Article 20 Section 2). Identifying the dignity-core of a basic right with its essence, we 
can understand this provision as a consequence of the absoluteness of Article 1. Human dignity is 
the absolute barrier to government (and private) action. It limits the restrictions that the German 
state can put on the freedom of individuals. Accordingly, human dignity is at times called 
“Schranken-Schranke” (barrier-barrier) in scholarly texts on German law (see, e.g., Degenhart 
2011, 191). Thus the relation between basic rights and human dignity is perhaps best understood 
as one of mutual influence. While human dignity provides the foundation for the basic rights, the 
basic rights help us to understand the meaning of human dignity. 
                                                 
11
 This right led to Germany’s strict limitations on abortion (BVerfGE 88, 203; BVerfGE 39, 1). 
12
 The Court, for example, declared a court-ordered puncture of an individual's vertebral canal for the purposes of 
obtaining evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial unconstitutional (BVerfGE 17, 108). 
13
 While the legislature has some discretion in its decisions how to protect human dignity, severe violations of human 
dignity such as rape must be subjected to criminal prosecution. 
14
 On the other hand, human dignity can be a reason to restrict basic rights. For example, the German legislature has a 
duty to prohibit the private infringement of human dignity and, for this purpose, must restrict the freedom of people 
accordingly. 
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The hierarchy of values outlined above becomes apparent, for example, in Germany’s approach to 
free speech. By virtue of the dignity clause, all ideas are subject to strict government control.15 
Accordingly, when free speech and human dignity collide, free speech – being the less important 
constitutional value – usually must give way. 
 
Consider the famous case concerning Klaus Mann’s novel Mephisto (BVerfGE 30, 173). In this 
novel, Mann tells the story of a Nazi collaborator who abandons his ethical values in order to 
make an artistic career under the National Socialists. Mann admittedly based the character of this 
artist loosely on the German actor Gustaf Gründgens (who was already deceased at the time the 
case reached the Court). A relative of Gründgens asked the courts to ban the novel, arguing that it 
dishonors Gründgens. After three lower courts reached contradictory verdicts, the case was 
handed over to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The Court found that the human 
dignity of Gründgens outweighs Mann's Article 5 right to freedom of artistic expression,16 and 
upheld the decision of one of the lower courts prohibiting the distribution of Mephisto in 
Germany.17 In its decision, the Court cited the fact, among others, that Gründgens is “a person of 
contemporary history and that public memory of him is still alive” (BVerfGE 30, 173). This 
mention of public memory reflects a culture of honor that has a long tradition in continental 
Europe. It is foreign, for example, to the United States legal system. As Whitman observes, 
“American law is just different” (Whitman 2000, 1382). It has “remarkably little to say about 
norms of hierarchical respect” (Whitman 2000, 1382). 
 
The Court regularly gives particularly little importance to political free speech. While this fact is 
understandable in the light of recent German history, it raises the question as to whether or not 
speech is in fact free in Germany in any substantial and meaningful sense. For example, it is 
illegal to sell copies of Hitler’s Mein Kampf (My Struggle), the German government runs an 
aggressive campaign against websites promoting Nazi ideology, and German criminal law 
prohibits Holocaust denial. Further, the Court may declare forfeiture of somebody’s basic right to 
freedom of expression if he or she uses this right “to combat the free democratic basic order” 
(Basic Law, Article 18). Accordingly, “an entire category of core political speech activity enjoys 
no protection whatsoever in the German constitutional system” (Krotoszynski 2004, 1554). 
 
                                                 
15
 In contrast, the right to free speech as formulated in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is 
absolute, if taken at face value. 
16
 “Arts […] shall be free” (Basic Law, Article 5 Section 3). 
17
 This shows that the human dignity of a person in Germany legally extends to the time after his or her death. 
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Hoping to have provided a sufficiently comprehensive picture of the German view of the 
interrelation of dignity and human rights, we shall proceed to determine the precise legal and 
philosophical content of the concept of human dignity in German constitutional law, aspects of 
which are taken to be at the core of the basic rights recognized by the Basic Law. 
 
The Object Formula in German Constitutional Law 
The modern concept of human dignity traces a line through the history of thought, and is closely 
related to the Judeo-Christian idea that humans are created in god’s image, and to the philosophy 
of autonomy. This line runs all the way back to the Stoics of Ancient Greece, and, on its way, 
touches on the thoughts of Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, Renaissance philosopher 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and others. Despite the conceptional tension between religious and 
secular concepts of human dignity, they all share the common idea that every human being has 
equal intrinsic value, regardless of ability or potential. This value is posited to be inalienable and 
inviolable. Maybe because this core meaning of human dignity is maximally compatible with the 
various traditional concepts of the term, the Court chose to adopt the general idea of equal worth 
as the basis of its interpretation of Article 1. This choice results in a rather narrow interpretation 
of the concept of human dignity, as required by the desire to keep its absoluteness from 
paralyzing the German government. 
 
In 1977, the Court was faced with the question whether life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole is constitutional (BVerfGE 45, 187). It held that the state “must regard every individual 
within society as having equal worth. It is contrary to human dignity to make persons the mere 
tools […] of the state” (BVerfGE 45, 227; Kommers 1989, 316). In particular, the state may not 
“turn the offender into an object of crime prevention to the detriment of his constitutionally 
protected right to social worth and respect” (BVerfGE 45, 187). In the opinion of the Court, a 
convict’s capacity to determine his or her own life would be denied were one to sentence him or 
her to life imprisonment without the chance to be freed before the time of his or her death. Such a 
denial would be tantamount to treating him or her as a mere object. The state, however, must 
regard persons as subjects. Persons must not be treated in a way that implies the negation of their 
belonging to humankind. Thus life imprisonment without the possibility of parole invades the 
absolutely inviolable sphere of human dignity. Accordingly, the Court declared this particular 
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kind of punishment unconstitutional.18 Its decision bears the imprint of Immanuel Kant’s moral 
philosophy, as is evident from the Court’s repeated reference to the objectification of persons. 
 
In another place in the life imprisonment decision, the Court explicitly recognizes that Article 1 
requires the principle that “each person must always be an end in himself” (BVerfGE 45, 228; 
Currie 1994, 314) to be respected. This test of whether human dignity is infringed upon is known 
as the Object Formula. The German constitutional scholar Günter Dürig famously provided the 
following explication of this formula: 
Human dignity as such is affected when a concrete human being is reduced to an 
object, to a mere means, to a dispensable quantity. [Infringements of dignity 
involve] the degradation of the person to a thing, which can, in its entirety, be 
grasped, disposed of, registered, brainwashed, replaced, used and expelled (Dürig 
1956, 125; translated in Botha 2009, 183). 
 
Interestingly, even though human dignity can be infringed upon, the Court has consistently held 
that a person can neither loose his or her inherent dignity (BVerfGE 87, 209), nor waive or forfeit 
it. If human dignity is inalienable and cannot be possibly lessened by whatever anybody might do, 
why do we need to protect it? The answer to this question lies in the fact that the human dignity 
clause, as interpreted by the Court, has a strong expressivist component insofar as it essentially 
refers to the “degradation” of the person to a thing. While a human being will always keep his or 
her dignity no matter how he or she is treated by others, he or she needs to be protected from 
behavior that displays disrespect towards his or her dignity. This expressivist component of 
human dignity played a prominent role in a decision of the Court on the tapping of telephones. In 
this decision, the Court held that to “violate human dignity, the treatment of a person […] must 
[…] be an expression of contempt for the value which accrues to every human being by virtue of 
the fact that he is a person” (BVerfGE 30, 1; translated in Botha 2009, 186; emphasis added). 
 
Anderson and Pildes (2000, 1527) define expressive harms as harms a person suffers “when she is 
treated according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her”. In this 
terminology, Article 1 protects persons in Germany from a certain kind of expressive harm. Under 
no circumstances may the state express disrespect towards the intrinsic value of a human being. 
Everybody is worthy of equal respect, and all legal norms must accord to the spirit of human 
dignity. 
 
                                                 
18
 Note that convicts regularly found to be dangerous by experts can be kept imprisoned indefinitely. Human dignity 
merely requires that the door to freedom is not closed in principle for anybody. 
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In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on the free world, the German legislature added § 
14.3 to the German Aviation Security Act (LuftSiG). § 14.3 authorizes the Bundeswehr – 
Germany’s armed forces – to shoot down any airplane with innocent passengers that is intended 
to be used as a weapon in a crime against human lives. A group of people who regularly uses 
airplanes for private and business travel filed a complaint with the Court, arguing that a law 
permitting the state to kill innocent people violates their basic rights as guaranteed by the Basic 
Law. The Court ruled: 
§ 14.3 of the Aviation Security Act is incompatible with the fundamental right to 
life and with the guarantee of human dignity to the extent that the use of armed 
force affects persons on board the aircraft who are not participants in the crime. By 
the state’s using their killing as a means to save others, they are treated as mere 
objects, which denies them the value that is due to a human being for his or her 
own sake (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2006). 
Thus according to the court, dignity must not be treated as a measurable quantity – because it is 
not. Consequently, killing a few innocent people to save many is not the kind of action a state 
committed to safeguarding human dignity may legitimately perform. In addition, the Court ruled 
that 
the assessment that the persons affected are doomed anyway cannot remove from 
the killing of innocent people in the situation described its nature of an 
infringement of these people’s right to dignity. Human life and human dignity 
enjoy the same constitutional protection regardless of the duration of the physical 
existence of the individual human being” (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2006). 
The Court concluded that § 14.3 of the German Aviation Security Act is incompatible with the 
Basic Law and, hence, void (1 BvR 357/05). 
 
To sum up, the German dignity clause makes the following three (partly independent) claims: 
(a) Every human being possesses equal intrinsic (moral) value. 
(b) The value of each human being is inalienable, unique, and irreplaceable and, hence, cannot 
be weighed against the value of others. 
(c) Under no circumstances may individuals and the state express disrespect towards the 
intrinsic value of a human being, be it through action or the passing of laws. In particular, 
human beings may not be reduced to a mere means. 
 
We shall undertake a critical examination of the place of human dignity in both the German and 
Kenyan constitutions after presenting an exposition of the position of human dignity in the 
Kenyan constitution. 
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Human Dignity in Kenyan Constitutional Law 
 
A Brief History of the Current Constitutional Order in Kenya 
It is important to point out at the outset that Kenya as a political community is less than a hundred 
years old, going back to the advent of the British invasion and subjugation of the territory that 
now bears the name Kenya. As such, the current Kenyan constitution is the product of historical 
antecedents quite different from those that culminated in the German one. Thus the four centuries 
of subjugation of various African ethnic communities by European imperialism manifested as 
slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism (Rodney 1973) culminated in the establishment of a 
Western-type state called Kenya out of numerous ethnic communities. 
 
The advent of the British invasion and subjugation of present-day Kenya commenced with the 
formal inauguration of the Imperial British East Africa Company rule in 1888, but more officially 
with the declaration of British East African Protectorate on the 1st of July, 1895 (Kihoro 2005, 8). 
An 1886 Anglo-German agreement had delineated the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar from 
the country’s coastline to ten miles into the interior (Brennan 2008, 838). In 1895, the Sultan of 
Zanzibar leased the administration of the strip to the British. These events set in motion the 
process of placing different ethnic communities with their diverse systems of government within 
one large and new area of central administration (Olumwullah 1990, 88; Jonyo 2002, 90). The 
territory beyond the ten-mile coastal strip was declared to be “Kenya Colony” in 1920 (Omolo 
2002, 213). Thus while the ten-mile coastal strip continued to be referred to as a Protectorate, the 
rest of the country was henceforth referred to as the Kenya Colony (Brennan 2008, 831). 
Nevertheless, the British administered the Protectorate and the Colony as a two-in-one unit out of 
expediency (Hassan 2002; Oduor 2012, 146-147). 
 
Kenya’s political independence in December 1963 was preceded by three constitutional 
conferences held in London’s Lancaster House in 1960, 1962 and 1963 (Ndegwa 1997, 602-604). 
In those conferences, the contentious issues had to do with the structure of government 
(regionalism versus unitarism) rather than with the Bill of Rights. The Kenya African National 
Union (KANU), a party mainly of the numerically advantaged Kikuyu and Luo, was in favour of 
a unitary state. However, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), supported by minority 
African communities such as the Turgen and the Giryama along with European settlers, favoured 
a regionalist (majimbo) system. To them, the prospect of Kikuyu-Luo dominance through KANU 
was real, since the two groups were larger, more politically conscious, and better organized than 
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the KADU groups, and presumably would win overwhelmingly at the polls (Odinga 1967, 227-
228; Ndegwa 1997, 605; Atieno-Odhiambo 2002, 239). Consequently, the independence 
constitution provided for eight regions, namely, Nairobi, Coast, Eastern, Central, Rift Valley, 
Nyanza, Western and North-Eastern, each with its own legislative and executive bodies (Republic 
of Kenya 1963, Chapter VI). 
 
At the dawn of its political independence, Kenya, like many other African countries, adopted a 
constitution that upheld the rights of the individual. Chapter 2 of Kenya’s independence 
constitution was effectively its Bill of Rights titled “Protection of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of the Individual”, and acknowledged the typical individual rights such as freedom of 
association, movement, conscience and expression (Republic of Kenya 1963). According to that 
Bill of Rights, individual citizens were entitled to sue the state when they felt aggrieved by it. This 
outlook was in line with the Western liberal democratic tradition, whose belief in the autonomy of 
the individual was articulated by the ancient Greeks, but came to prominence with the European 
Age of Enlightenment in the eighteenth century C.E., finding significant practical expression in 
the American and French Revolutions. In the light of such an extensive Bill of Rights, it is rather 
surprising to find no single mention of the phrase “human dignity” in the independence 
Constitution of Kenya. Apparently, to the drafters of that document, the concept of human dignity 
was not central to the protection of the various rights of the individual citizen. In due course, 
Chapter 2 of the 1963 constitution was converted into Chapter 5 (Republic of Kenya 2008). 
 
Furthermore, when Kenya attained her political independence in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta ascended 
to leadership, first as Prime Minister, then as President. The change from Prime Minister to 
President was crucial to the process of increasing Kenyatta’s unchecked power. As Prime 
Minister, Kenyatta was directly answerable to parliament, and it is this accountability that he 
sought to put aside through a series of constitutional amendments. 
 
First, Kenyatta’s KANU government initiated a series of constitutional amendments that 
concentrated power in the hands of the central government at the expense of the district and 
regional authorities. These amendments produced a strong provincial administration, which 
became an instrument of central control. 
 
Second, Kenyatta’s government initiated amendments that produced a hybrid constitution, in 
which the inherited parliamentary system of governance was replaced by a strong executive 
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presidency without the checks and balances requisite for a meaningful separation of powers 
(Badejo 2006, 254-255). 
 
Third, Kenyatta’s government pressurized the opposition party, KADU, to dissolve itself and to 
have its Members of Parliament incorporated into the ruling party, KANU. The upshot was that in 
the absence of any legal and official opposition and despite the constitutional provision for 
parliamentary democracy, Kenyatta quickly created a highly centralized and authoritarian republic 
reminiscent of the colonial state (Mutua 2001, 97). 
 
At the death of Kenyatta in 1978, Daniel arap Moi inherited an immensely powerful presidency, 
and took several measures to retain it and even to increase its power. The most significant step in 
this regard was his amendment of the constitution in 1982 to make Kenya a de jure one-party 
state. Furthermore, Moi’s control of the single party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) 
was almost absolute, so that the one-party rule was effectively a one-man rule (see Oduor 2012, 
162-170). 
 
During the period of de jure one-party state in Kenya from 1982 to 1991, there was increasing 
dissatisfaction with the way in which sections of the Independence Constitution were changed and 
power was concentrated in the presidency. Indeed, the many political, social and economic 
problems facing the country were attributed to deficiencies in the constitution. The pressure for a 
review of the constitution heightened as the movement for the restoration of multi-party politics 
initially championed by academics and politicians in the early 1980s gained momentum in the 
early 1990s, led by the Citizens’ Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs) and religious 
organisations (Ndegwa 1997, 606-607; Atieno-Odhiambo 2002, 226; Lumumba 2008, 1). 
 
In 1990, a number of forces were marshalled against Moi’s single-party regime. Among these 
were the original radical tradition of dissent sustained by Oginga Odinga for three decades, 
opposition from several religious leaders, a tradition of protest sustained by groups of intellectuals 
and students at university campuses since the 1960s, a group of reformist constitutional lawyers, 
and Western bilateral and multilateral financiers (Atieno-Odhiambo 2002, 226; Badejo 2006, 156-
176). It was against this background that the relevant organs of KANU met in early December 
1991 to endorse the repeal of Section 2 (a) of the then Constitution of Kenya, thereby effectively 
ending a decade of de jure one-party rule (Oyugi 1997, 47). 
 
56 Rainer Ebert and Reginald M.J. Oduor 
Despite the return to multi-party politics in December 1991, the political infrastructure for a one-
man dictatorship in Kenya continued to be in place for over a decade, mainly due to the disunity 
among the opposition parties that would have forced a change. Thus the Moi and Kibaki regimes 
repeatedly frustrated the process of writing a new constitution in order to retain power (Lumumba 
2008; Oduor 2012, 211-213). However, after the crisis precipitated by the contested 2007 
elections, the process of writing a new constitution made considerable progress due to intense 
pressure from the foreign governments and agencies that had facilitated the negotiations that led 
to the formation of the coalition government to end the crisis. Thus Kenyan voters ratified a new 
constitution in a referendum on the 4th of August, 2010, which was subsequently promulgated on 
the 27th of August, 2010. 
 
However, a most regrettable fact is that the debate concerning the kind of constitution Kenya 
should have is often trapped in Western conceptions. Thus during the public debates over various 
drafts of what became the current Kenyan constitution (Republic of Kenya 2010), the citizens 
were made to believe that if they adopted a parliamentary system of governance, they would be 
bound to, at the very least, have both a president and a prime minister. Clearly the paradigm in 
view was the Westminster one, with a monarch as head of state and a prime minister as head of 
government. The possibility of adopting the South African model, where the president is both 
head of state and government, but is chosen by parliament, was rarely, if ever, considered, despite 
its evident advantages over the Westminster model (Oduor 2009, 23-24). Similarly, Kenyans were 
told that the only other option to the Westminster model was a presidential system after the 
pattern of the United States of America. Very little discussion was held on the possibility of 
incorporating elements of indigenous African political systems into the country’s new constitution 
(see Ojanga 2009). 
 
Provisions on Human Dignity in the Current Constitution of Kenya 
We first meet the phrase “human dignity” in Article 10 of the current Constitution of Kenya, titled 
“National values and principles of governance”, which sets out by stating: 
The national values and principles of governance in this Article bind all State 
organs, State officers, public officers and all persons whenever any of them— (a) 
applies or interprets this Constitution; (b) enacts, applies or interprets any law; or 
(c) makes or implements public policy decisions (Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 
10 (1)). 
It then goes on to state: 
The national values and principles of governance include— (a) patriotism, national 
unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law, democracy and 
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participation of the people; (b) human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, 
equality, human rights, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalised; (c) 
good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability; and (d) sustainable 
development (Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 10 (2)). 
 
At least two issues are unclear with regard to Article 10 of the Kenyan constitution. First, what is 
the distinction between “values” and “principles”? Did the drafters of the constitution assume that 
values and principles are indistinguishable? If so, why did they not choose only one term to refer 
to whatever the two terms denote? If not, why did they not make the distinction clear? Second, 
what did the drafters of the constitution see as the relationship between human dignity and the 
other “values and principles” that they listed in Article 10? Are some of the “values and 
principles” cardinal, or do they all enjoy an equal status? What is to happen if there is a conflict 
between or among the various “values and principles”? 
 
We next find the word “dignity” in Chapter Four, which is the Bill of Rights. Article 19 is on 
“Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. It states that “the purpose of recognising and protecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities 
and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all human beings” (Republic of 
Kenya 2010, Article 19 (2)). Interestingly, in this sub-article, not only are individuals said to have 
dignity, but also communities. The same outlook is manifest in the national oath and affirmation 
to be executed by the President, Acting President, and Deputy President at their assumption of 
office, in which they undertake to “protect and uphold the sovereignty, integrity and dignity of the 
people of Kenya” (Republic of Kenya 2010, Third Schedule). This approach is alien to traditional 
Western liberal thought, which focuses on the rights of the individual, but strikes resonance with 
the agitation for group rights that is currently rising to a crescendo in many parts of the world, 
Kenya included (see Oduor 2012). Strangely, however, the very next sub-article reverts to a 
typical Western liberal orientation by asserting that the rights and fundamental freedoms 
recognised in the Bill of Rights belong to individuals (Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 19 (3) 
(a)). 
 
In addition, the Constitution of Kenya provides that in interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or other authority shall promote ”the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality, equity and freedom” (Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 20 (4) 
(a)). Here again, it is not clear what “values that underlie an open and democratic society” are: we 
are told that such a society is based on “human dignity, equality, equity and freedom”, but the 
phrase “values that underlie […]” a few words earlier in the formulation of this sub-article gives 
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the impression that such a society is guided by certain values that are not listed in the article. 
What is more, “human dignity, equality, equity and freedom” are listed without any indication of 
the relationships pertaining among them: is any one or a combination of them more basic than the 
rest? We are not told. 
 
On the limitation of rights and fundamental freedoms, the constitution stipulates that a “right or 
fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors” (Republic of Kenya 
2010, Article 24 (1)). Note that here the democratic society is said to be “based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom”, thereby excluding “equity” which had earlier been included in Article 20 
(4) (a). This is a cause for further concern that the conceptualization of a democratic society in 
this constitution was not sufficiently refined. 
 
Besides, the Constitution of Kenya is very unclear about the meaning of “dignity”. This fact is 
most evident in Article 28, which, although it is titled “Human Dignity”, does not explicate the 
meaning, basis or scope of human dignity; instead, it simply states that “every person has inherent 
dignity and the right to have that dignity respected and protected.” Furthermore, the constitution 
provides that a person with any disability is entitled “to be treated with dignity and respect and to 
be addressed and referred to in a manner that is not demeaning” (Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 
54 (1) (a)). Moreover, the constitution provides that the state “shall take measures to ensure the 
rights of older persons […] to live in dignity and respect and be free from abuse” (Republic of 
Kenya 2010, Article 57 (c)). The provisions of Articles 54 and 57 quoted above suggest that for 
the drafters of this constitution, there is a distinction between treating a person with dignity and 
treating him or her with respect. Such a distinction is problematic, in view of the fact that the idea 
of dignity is inextricably bound up with that of respect. Indeed, the American Heritage Dictionary 
defines “dignity” as the “quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect” (The Editors of the 
American Heritage Dictionaries 2011). 
 
Furthermore, on objects and functions of the National Police Service, the Constitution of Kenya 
states that the National Police Service shall, among other things, “train staff to the highest 
possible standards of competence and integrity and to respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and dignity” (Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 244 (d)). Here again, the talk about 
“human rights and fundamental freedoms and dignity” suggests that the drafters of the 
constitution were uncertain or negligent about the relationships among these various concepts. 
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This is due to the fact that it is superfluous to mention “dignity” once one has listed “human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” which are usually understood to be based on the idea of human 
dignity. Indeed, even the phrase “human rights and fundamental freedoms” is itself superfluous, 
because the rights of the individual are inextricably bound up with his or her fundamental 
freedoms. 
 
It is also noteworthy that in some instances, the Constitution of Kenya uses the term “dignity” in 
relation to offices and institutions. For example, in its provisions on leadership and integrity 
(Chapter Six), it attributes the term “dignity” to a public position rather than to a person or group 
of persons. Thus with regard to responsibilities of leadership, it states that authority assigned to a 
state officer is a public trust to be exercised in a manner that “brings honour to the nation and 
dignity to the office” (Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 73 (1) (a) (iii)). Furthermore, at the 
assumption of office, a Cabinet Secretary (“Cabinet Minister” under the former constitution), in 
the Oath or Solemn Affirmation of Due Execution of Office, undertakes to hold his or her “office 
as Cabinet Secretary with honour and dignity”. Similarly, on the assumption of office, the Chief 
Justice and judges of various courts (Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court) are 
required to undertake to “protect, administer and defend this constitution with a view to upholding 
the dignity and the respect for the judiciary and the judicial system of Kenya” (Republic of Kenya 
2010, Third Schedule). 
 
In the instances in the foregoing paragraph, the drafters of the constitution seem to have thought 
that there is a distinction between dignity on the one hand, and honour or respect on the other, 
contrary to the facts. It is also not clear why members of the National Assembly and of the Senate 
are not required to undertake to uphold the “dignity” of their positions. Moreover, of great interest 
to the present discussion is the nature of dignity when it is attributed to an institution or an office 
on the one hand, and to an individual or a group of individuals on the other. If at all such a 
distinction exists, the constitution does not make it clear. 
 
In sum, the term “dignity” appears in many places in the Constitution of Kenya. However, the 
constitution does not spell out the meaning intended in the use of the term, neither can the 
meaning be determined from the context due to the reasons indicated in the foregoing discussion. 
What is more, unlike the German constitution where human dignity is the unequivocal basis of 
civil liberties, it is one among several “national values and principles of governance” in the 
Kenyan constitution (Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 10). The vagueness of the conception of 
human dignity in the current Kenyan constitution can be accounted for in terms of the importation 
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of Western thought without due reflection on it. Indeed, the current human rights discourse in 
Kenya, as in most parts of the world, is dominated by Western liberal ideas, with the concept of 
human dignity at their core. However, this is not clearly reflected in the Constitution of Kenya. 
This in itself would not have been a shortcoming if the constitution had presented a clear, 
internally consistent alternative to the Western framework. 
 
Some Critical Remarks on Human Dignity in the German and Kenyan 
Constitutions: A Dialogue 
In this section, we present a dialogue between the two of us on our sometimes divergent, 
sometimes convergent, views on human dignity in the constitutions of Germany and Kenya. 
 
Does Human Dignity Have a Rational Basis in the Case of the So-called 
Marginal Humans? 
Ebert. While the concept of human dignity has some intuitive appeal from a philosophical 
perspective concerned with human autonomy and self-determination, it runs into trouble in the 
case of human beings who lack the relevant capacities. Certain mental illnesses deprive the 
affected of their capacity to make free choices and, hence, to determine the course of their life 
autonomously. Since human dignity derives part of its meaning from the right to determine the 
course of one’s own life, it is questionable how the claim that so-called marginal humans have 
full human dignity could be supported rationally. It seems to me that it is the free choices of moral 
agents (and the interests of moral patients) that ought to enjoy foremost protection rather than the 
dignity of human beings.19 
 
Oduor. I concur that the notion of human dignity is often unduly exalted above the free choices of 
moral agents (and the interests of moral patients). This is certainly so in the cases that my 
colleague cites from the German experience. However, the term “marginal humans” is based on 
the idea that full humans are those who can determine the course of their lives through the 
exercise of their rational faculties. Such a Kantian conceptualization of the essence of the human 
person would presumably place humans who do not have the ability to exercise rationality under 
the category of “moral patients”. 
                                                 
19
 Moral patients are animals, human or non-human, “who have desires and beliefs, who perceive, remember, and act 
intentionally, who have a sense of the future, including their own future […], who have an emotional life, who have a 
psychophysical identity over time, who have a kind of autonomy […], and who have an experiential welfare” (Regan 
2004b, 153), but who are not morally accountable for what they do. 
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However, it seems to me that to exalt the rational aspect of humanness is to assume, quite 
unjustifiably, that there is a clear criterion for determining the line between humans who can 
exercise their rationality and those who cannot. In view of states such as “shock”, “temporary 
insanity” and “being overcome by emotions”, it seems to me safer to accept all human beings as 
fully human, and to aid any of them who, temporarily or permanently, are unable to exercise their 
rational faculty. In this regard, Lawrence Mute’s insightful article, “Shattering the Glass Ceiling: 
Ensuring the Right to Vote for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities In Kenya” (Mute 2010), is 
particularly relevant. For example, concerning the widespread idea that “persons of unsound 
mind” should be barred from voting because they are incapable of properly using the vote, Mute 
observes that “non-disabled” electorates keep choosing “bad” leaders (Mute 2010, 8). The 
irrational manner in which Kenyan leaders and electorate precipitated the post-2007 elections 
crisis is hardly evidence that the “sound of mind” can do much better than the so-called “unsound 
of mind”. 
 
What is more, those who talk about “marginal humans” are probably confusing “humanness” and 
“personhood”, in which case the recent philosophical discourse on “personhood” gives them an 
opportunity to reconsider their position (see for examples Taylor 1989; Wiredu 1996; Masolo 
2010). For example, For Wiredu who rejects the dualism between mind and body, we are all 
humans at birth, but we are not persons. For us to become persons, the mind must be formed in 
us. For this to occur, communication from society to us has to take place (Wiredu 1996, 21-22). 
As Masolo (2010, 155) explains, for Wiredu, “we become persons through acquiring and 
participating in the socially generated knowledge of norms and actions that we learn to live by in 
order to impose humaneness upon our humanness.” Thus according to this line of thinking, an 
individual who from birth is isolated from human society would be a human being but not a 
person (Masolo 2010, 173-174). 
 
Does Human Dignity Cripple the Freedom of Competent Adults? 
Ebert. Since human dignity is absolute, it also extends to cases of self-degrading behavior. 
Consequently, it can, and, as a matter of fact, has been used to restrict the freedom of those 
engaging in such behavior, such as actresses performing in peep shows (BVerwGE 64, 274). 
Respecting a competent human being first and foremost means respecting his or her free choices 
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insofar as these choices do not infringe upon the moral rights of others. Attempts to protect the 
dignity of a peep show actress against herself in the name of a moral view she may not share fails 
to respect the woman as an autonomous subject. The hierarchy of values formulated in the Basic 
Law constitutes an authoritarian imposition of its authors’ moral view on all those living in 
Germany. In my opinion, this is an unfortunate contradiction to the anti-totalitarian spirit in which 
the Basic Law was written. 
 
Oduor. The idea of refraining from interfering with the freedom of competent adults to act 
according to their own choices as long as they do not infringe upon the moral rights of others 
seems to be a version of J. S. Mill’s harm principle, which he famously articulated in his 1859 
essay, “On Liberty” (see Mill 1999). While it sounds like a reasonable imperative, it is extremely 
difficult to see where it actually applies. For example, if I eat “junk food” so regularly that I 
become obese and greatly increase the chances of my getting a heart attack, I could tell anyone 
who warns me about my action that it is “none of their business”; but is this really so? What if it 
is my wife who would be widowed by my getting a fatal heart attack? In view of the fact that 
humans are social beings, similar questions could be raised about almost any form of behaviour a 
competent adult might wish to engage in. As the Swahili people of East Africa say “Mtu ni watu”, 
literally meaning “A person is people”, that is, without society, the individual’s personhood is 
meaningless. Even the English, despite their liberal outlook, say that “No man is an island”. It 
therefore seems to me more realistic to admit that what is required is the balancing of the liberties 
of various competent adults who share a moral space rather than the aspiration for a realm of 
unquestioned liberties for any of them. 
 
Does Human Dignity Put Serious Restraints on the Freedom of Expression? 
Ebert.  As evident from the Mephisto case and other examples we gave above, there are 
significant limits on the freedom of expression in Germany. In particular, political speech aiming 
at establishing a constitutional order different from the one defined in the Basic Law enjoys no 
legal protection, and could even result in criminal prosecution. Given that human dignity is an 
expressive concept and binds not only the state but also the individual, this is not surprising. In 
the words of Tarunabh Khaitan, “legal enforcement of expressive norms in horizontal (i.e. citizen-
citizen) relationships is bound to be in tension with a citizen's right to freedom of expression” 
(Khaitan 2011, 27). The Bundestag, the lower house of parliament in Germany, however, is 
eternally bound by the eternity clause to protect the dignity of human beings in their private 
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relationships with other human beings, and hence has to find other means to advance the freedom 
of expression within the German legal framework. 
 
Oduor. On this point I am in total concurrence with regard to the place of human dignity in the 
German constitution. For one citizen or a group of citizens to come up with a provision which 
they make the foundation of a country’s constitutional order and which they then insulate from 
any amendments is authoritarianism of the worst kind. While the provision on the supremacy of 
human dignity in the German constitution was purportedly intended to protect Germany from ever 
falling into the fires of totalitarianism again, it seems to have the potential to result in the very 
situation it was intended to preempt. In the case of the Kenyan constitution, however, the concept 
of human dignity is so hazy in its formulation and so obscured by other moral concepts that it is 
highly unlikely to result in totalitarianism. 
 
Is Human Dignity Speciesist? 
Ebert. The concept of human dignity is morally objectionable because it wrongfully discriminates 
against non-human sentient beings. It makes an absolute moral difference between human beings 
and other animals,20 where there is no morally relevant difference (Singer 1975; Regan 1983; 
Ebert 2007). It is wildly implausible to assume that any moral value could derive merely from 
being a member of the species homo sapiens. Moral philosophy must not essentially refer to 
species membership as such. The state, any state, should not do so either insofar as it seeks to 
protect the basic moral rights of those living within its jurisdiction. The worldview that several 
African theologians and philosophers frequently refer to, according to which human beings are 
worth incomparably more than other animals (Tempels 1959; Mbiti 1969), reminds one of 
Aristotle’s hierarchy of being, which provided one of the first rationalizations of patriarchy and 
slavery. Today, we reject sexism and racism, and I believe we also need to reject this classical 
concept of natural hierarchy with regard to non-human animals. The struggle for women’s rights, 
the movement for the abolition of slavery and the modern animal rights movement are intimately 
and inseparably connected. 
 
Oduor. I share the concern for the need to eradicate sexism, slavery, racism and every other form 
of oppression in human society. However, I disagree with the claim that “the struggle for 
women’s rights, the movement for the abolition of slavery and the modern animal rights 
movement are intimately and inseparably connected.” For at least five reasons, I do not think that 
                                                 
20
 Human beings are animals. They are great apes, and the only living species of the genus Homo. 
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the agitation for animal rights, the struggle against “speciesism”, is part of humankind’s journey 
towards liberty for all. 
 
First, the claim that the concept of natural hierarchy necessarily leads to oppression is debatable, 
because the fact that there are simple and complex forms of life is difficult to deny, and is what 
causes many to view the world as being ordered hierarchically. Thus to claim that the amoeba and 
the human being are equal simply because both are forms of animate life is to fly in the face of the 
facts. 
 
Second, it is difficult to gainsay the fact that certain life forms depend on others. For example, the 
lion depends on the antelope for its food. Similarly, I depend on the cow to get some proteins, and 
so I cannot accept the accusation that I am being speciesist when I enjoy a piece of grilled steak. 
What I must ensure, as a moral agent, is that the cow from which I get the proteins I need does not 
undergo unnecessary suffering during its life and on the occasion of its death. 
 
Third, the practice of medicine often involves finding ways to kill the various life forms that live 
in our bodies as parasites - worms and malaria protozoa are cases in point. If it is wrong to kill a 
cow so that I may eat beef, why is it right to destroy the colony of malaria parasites in my system 
so that I can live? 
 
Fourth, the charge of “speciesism” seems to be based on neo-Darwinist evolutionism, which is a 
metaphysical rather than a scientific position. It is metaphysical because it is based on the 
assumption that the ultimate reality is matter, and is in opposition to another metaphysical 
position, idealism, which asserts that the ultimate reality is ideas. It is also metaphysical because it 
touches on the question of origins, yet it is impossible to demonstrate empirically that the various 
life forms came from a single biological ancestor. As such, it seems to me that the best that people 
with divergent metaphysical inclinations can do is to be open to dialogue among themselves. 
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Fifth, although the idea of dignity has been abused, it does not follow that it has no positive 
content. Interpreted naturalistically, it could be viewed as that sense of self worth that each of us 
has, and which each of us needs in order to choose and pursue our goals in life. 
 
Ebert. Many people, both members of the general public and philosophers, resist the idea that 
humans and other animals are equals, as well as the idea that non-human animals have rights. 
Some of the objections raised by my colleague are among the most common objections voiced 
against these ideas. Hence, I would like to use this opportunity to respond to these objections, 
hoping to clear up some widespread misconceptions. Given the limits of this paper, I cannot do 
justice to the rich body of arguments in defense of animals that has been produced by moral 
philosophers in recent decades. My responses are necessarily brief and incomplete, and I 
recommend Singer (1975) and Regan (2004a) for those who would like to read more. 
 
My colleague writes that “to claim that the amoeba and the human being are equal simply because 
both are forms of animate life is to fly in the face of the facts”. If we take the word “equal” to 
mean “identical”, he is right. Amoebas are not human. However, they are equal in a sense. They 
are equal in that they are both living organisms. When animal advocates say that humans and 
certain animals are equal, they do not mean to say that they are identical, but rather that they are 
relevantly similar, equal in a morally significant respect. When it comes to the question where to 
draw the line between those who have rights and those who do not have rights, species 
membership as such has no moral import. Drawing the line along species boundaries would be as 
arbitrary as drawing it along gender or ethnic boundaries. 
 
American philosopher Tom Regan argues that we should draw the line between those who have a 
life that can go better or worse, from their point of view, and those who do not have such a life. 
He calls those who fall into the former category experiencing subjects-of-life: they have beliefs, 
desires, feelings, memory and a rich emotional life, and what happens to them matters to them. 
According to Regan, all experiencing subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, and have a 
right to be treated in a way that respects their inherent value. 
 
In contrast, Australian philosopher Peter Singer, currently the Ira W. DeCamp Professor of 
Bioethics at Princeton University, argues that the community of moral equals includes those, and 
only those, who have interests, and that those, and only those, who have the capacity to 
experience pleasure and pain have interests. Equality, for him, means that all interests are given 
equal consideration, as interests are interests, no matter who has them (Singer 2011). 
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According to the best of our scientific knowledge (which, by the way, includes the theory of 
evolution), amoebas, malaria protozoa and worms meet neither Regan’s nor Singer’s criterion. 
Strictly speaking, the case for animal rights is a case for the rights of mammals, birds and 
amphibians, and maybe reptiles, fish, octopi, squids, crustaceans and mollusks (Ebert 2011). It is 
wrong to keep cows in factory farms and then kill them for food because we fail to treat them in a 
way that respects their inherent value when we use them as mere means for our ends, or, 
alternatively, because the brief moment of pleasure we gain from eating beef does not justify 
imposing a lifetime of suffering on a cow. Amoebas, malaria protozoa and worms, on the other 
hand, most likely neither have the capacity to suffer, nor do their lives matter to them. Hence, they 
do not deserve moral consideration. 
 
Now I must admit that, as my colleague writes, “the lion depends on the antelope for its food”, 
and predation indeed is a serious problem for the philosophy of animal rights. I have addressed 
this problem in detail elsewhere (see Ebert and Machan 2012), and I shall not repeat my 
arguments here. However, there is an important difference between us and the lion. While lions 
have to kill other animals to survive, we do not (see Cohen and Regan 2001, 215). Contrary to 
what my colleague writes, he does not “depend on the cow to get some proteins”. A well-balanced 
vegan diet is healthy and is often said to decrease the chances of suffering from diseases such as 
diabetes, heart disease, stroke and some cancers (see Craig and Mangels 2009). It is also better for 
the environment. Going vegan is likely the single most effective step one can take toward 
protecting the planet. A vegan diet requires only a fraction of the land and water needed to 
produce a typical non-vegan diet, and a vegan diet produces only a fraction of the greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with a typical non-vegan diet. 
 
Oduor. My colleague’s explication of the meaning of the term “equal” as used by animal rights 
advocates does not seem to me to have addressed my concern. This is because I did not mean to 
suggest that the equality between humans and other animate life forms is “sameness”. Indeed, the 
discussion we are having is a moral one, so the only relevant equality would have to be one with 
moral implications. Who decides on this kind of equality? I think an element of subjectivity in the 
making of this decision is inevitable. For example, if a lion accosted me, I would not hesitate to 
shoot it dead in the name of equality of different life forms. 
 
My colleague further writes that, “when it comes to the question where to draw the line between 
those who have rights and those who do not have rights, species membership as such has no moral 
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import.” The assertion is based on the idea of interests, and yet “interests” is being assessed from 
the animal rights advocates’ own point of view. Thus concerning the claim that simpler life forms 
such as amoeba, malaria protozoa and worms do not experience pain and pleasure, and that 
therefore they have no interests, is one that is difficult to demonstrate for the simple reason that 
none of us can ever become an amoeba, a malaria protozoa or a worm. As such, the demarcation 
that my colleague makes between life forms with interests and those without seems to me to be as 
arbitrary as the claim that the idea of rights ought not to be limited to human beings. As for the 
assertion that a vegan diet is healthier than a diet that includes meat, it has not been demonstrated. 
 
Is Human Dignity Idolatry towards the Dead? 
Ebert. As clarified by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in its decision in the 
Mephisto case, human dignity extends to the deceased. Accordingly, a dead body may not be 
reduced to a mere object. Organs may, hence, be surgically removed after death only if the 
deceased consented prior to death or his or her relatives consent on his or her behalf. While even 
the dead enjoy absolute protection under German law, chimpanzees and other highly evolved 
mammals are not granted any legal rights by the Basic Law. I guess the absurd consequence 
would be that the torture and killing of any number of chimpanzees could legally be justified to 
protect the dignity of one dead body. The protection of a dead body as such is also bizarre in its 
own right. How can an action be wrong without wronging anybody?21 
 
Oduor. I share the view that there is no moral justification for giving undue attention to the 
dignity of the dead at the expense of the welfare of the living. I am reminded of how many of my 
people, the Luo, are reluctant to contribute to the medical expenses of a sick person, only to show 
great enthusiasm to contribute towards the funeral expenses when the person dies. 
 
Does Human Dignity Restrict Our Ability to Defend Ourselves and Others? 
Ebert. While the Court’s decision to void § 14.3 of the German Aviation Security Act clearly 
shows that innocent lives may not be weighed against each other, it makes it equally clear that the 
killing of a person as such is not necessarily a violation of human dignity. According to the Court, 
§ 14.3 […] is […] compatible with […] the Basic Law to the extent that the direct 
use of armed force is aimed […] exclusively at persons who want to use the 
aircraft as a weapon of a crime against the lives of people on the ground. It 
corresponds to the attacker’s position as a subject if the consequences of his or her 
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self-determined conduct are attributed to him or her personally, and if the attacker 
is held responsible for the events that he or she started (Bundesverfassungsgericht 
2006). 
Now imagine the case of a child who came into the possession of a gun and started shooting at a 
crowd of people. Suppose the only way to stop this killing spree is to shoot the child in the head. 
In accordance with its argument in the § 14.3 case, the Court would have to find that killing the 
innocent child reduced him or her to a mere means to protect the lives of other people and, hence, 
violated Article 1. Therefore, the state may not order the police to shoot the child in order to save 
innocent lives. Similarly, a mentally ill person, neither morally nor legally responsible for his 
actions,22 who hijacks an airplane and intends to crash it into downtown Frankfurt, could not be 
shot down. 
 
Oduor. I agree with my colleague on this point. To enjoin a person to refrain from killing another 
person in self-defense, or in defense of those around him or her, on the basis of the human dignity 
of the assailant is to demand that he or she acts contrary to his or her natural inclination without a 
sound basis for the demand. 
 
Does Human Dignity Prevent Us from Finding the Ticking Bomb? 
Ebert. Part of what it means to uphold human dignity is to respect the physical integrity of people. 
Hence under German law, torture is unconditionally prohibited. Some years back, a police officer 
in the city of Frankfurt threatened a suspect with torture with the intention to coerce him to 
disclose the location of a child who had been kidnapped.23 As a result, the police officer lost his 
job and was criminally prosecuted. In its verdict, the criminal court handling the case emphasized 
that torture can never be justified due to the absolute guarantee of human dignity within the 
jurisdiction of the Basic Law (Landgericht Frankfurt 2005). Accordingly, a terrorist who admits to 
having planted a ticking bomb in an unknown skyscraper in Frankfurt cannot be threatened with 
torture, let alone actually be tortured. Torture is uncivilized and inhumane, but one would be too 
quick to conclude that it is always morally wrong. If we have a moral right to kill attackers in acts 
of self-defense, why would we not have a right to inflict pain on criminals to defend others? 
 
Oduor. Like the German constitution, the Kenyan one absolutely prohibits torture (Republic of 
Kenya 2010, Article 29, read with Article 24). Yet as my colleague correctly observes, there are 
occasions when we may be forced to use violence, including torture, to protect ourselves and 
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 In other words, he or she is merely a moral patient and not a moral agent. 
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 As a matter of fact, the child was already dead at the time at which the threat was made. 
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those around us. In fact, for the terrorist’s “dignity” to be upheld by refraining from torturing him 
or her, are we not compromising his or her intended victims’ right to life, and with it their 
dignity? 
 
Is the Concept of Human Dignity Indeterminate? 
Ebert. In a decision on abortion, the Court held that, “[w]herever human life exists, it merits 
human dignity; whether the subject of this dignity is conscious of it and knows how to safeguard 
it is not of decisive moment. The potential capabilities inherent in human existence from its 
inception are adequate to establish human dignity” (BVerfGE 39, 1). As a result, abortions are de 
jure illegal in Germany. However, doctors are not prosecuted in certain well-defined cases of 
early-term abortion. On the other hand, one could argue that by preventing a woman from 
performing abortion, the state instrumentalizes her as a means to protect the fetus’ life.24 The 
concept of “objectification” seems to be hopelessly vague and, hence, the object formula is 
inconclusive. 
 
Oduor. I think that the court’s ruling concerning the human dignity of the unborn child is 
justifiable on the ground that the unborn child did not force his or her way into the mother’s 
womb. Except in the case of rape, the mother decided, passively or actively, to have a child. Even 
in the case of rape, repugnant as that act is, the unborn child is not the culprit - the rapist is. 
Besides, it should be obvious upon momentary reflection that aborting such a child would not 
reverse the heinous crime visited upon the mother. Above all, why should we appeal to the 
unacceptability of “objectification” or “instrumentalization” of the mother to justify the abortion, 
and not apply the same principle to the right of the unborn child - that by the mother aborting him 
or her, she is using him or her as a mere means to her convenience? 
 
Is Human Dignity an Obstacle to Moral Progress? 
Ebert. The rise of new technology, in particular in the fields of medicine and biology, is 
frequently accompanied by complex moral questions over which disagreement is reasonable. 
Examples that instantly come to mind are cloning, embryo and stem cell research, and pre-
implantation diagnostics. As evident from the case of abortion, there is a real danger that human 
dignity is invoked to prematurely end discussions about legal issues relating to such new 
                                                 
24
 Abortion then becomes a case where the dignity of the fetus has to be weighed against the dignity of the woman 
concerned. This is a dilemma since the dignity of human beings cannot be weighed against each other. 
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technologies. Human dignity is a conversation-stopper and, hence, potentially detrimental to the 
democratic process. Its absoluteness and eternity prevents the German people from introducing 
competing values and making room for exceptions where appropriate in light of new 
developments in science and elsewhere. 
 
Oduor. With regard to the German constitution, human dignity is an obstacle to moral progress. 
This is due to the fact that by restricting the citizens’ freedom of expression, it discourages free 
thought which is indispensable to innovation. In the case of the Kenyan constitution, human 
dignity has been formulated so vaguely, and its application left so indeterminately, that it is of 
very little practical use. This has been evident in the debates over the numerous pieces of 
legislation to operationalize the constitution: rarely, if ever, does one hear reference to human 
dignity as a constitutional principle worth considering in the formulation of such legislation. 
Similarly, the numerous suits filed in Kenyan courts on the basis of the country’s constitution do 
not focus on the issue of human dignity, but rather on various provisions of the constitution that 
have to do with citizens’ or institutions’ specific powers and entitlements. Consequently, if human 
dignity is an obstacle to moral progress in Kenya, it is because it is presented too vaguely in the 
country’s constitution to be a point of informed moral debate. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has interrogated the concept of human dignity in German and Kenyan constitutional 
law. It set out by presenting human dignity in the German constitution, and then outlined the place 
of human dignity in the Kenyan constitution, before presenting a dialogue between its two authors 
on the shortcomings of the formulations of human dignity in the two constitutions. In the light of 
the foregoing reflections, we conclude that, in the German constitution, human dignity has been 
formulated in such a way as to unnecessarily limit the freedom of action among the citizens and to 
stifle their right to engage in debate on pertinent issues. In the case of the Kenyan constitution, the 
formulation of human dignity is too vague to provoke meaningful discussion concerning it among 
the citizenry. In both cases, moral progress is stifled. We therefore propose that philosophers 
inside and outside these two countries give greater attention to the task of reflecting on the 
meaning, basis and scope of human dignity, with a view to stimulating informed public debate on 
this influential concept. 
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